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W
e analyze a discrete clock auction with lowest-accepted-bid (LAB) pricing and provisional winners, as
adopted by India for its 3G spectrum auction. In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, the provisional winner
shades her bid, whereas provisional losers do not. Such differential shading leads to inefﬁciency. An auction with
highest-rejected-bid (HRB) pricing and exit bids is strategically simple, has no bid shading, and is fully efﬁcient.
In addition, it has higher revenues than the LAB auction, assuming proﬁt-maximizing bidders. The bid shading
in the LAB auction exposes a bidder to the possibility of losing the auction at a price below the bidder’s value.
Thus, a fear of losing at proﬁtable prices may cause bidders in the LAB auction to bid more aggressively than
predicted, assuming proﬁt-maximizing bidders. We extend the model by adding an anticipated loser’s regret to
the payoff function. Revenue from the LAB auction yields higher expected revenue than the HRB auction when
bidders’ fear of losing at proﬁtable prices is sufﬁciently strong. This would provide one explanation why India,
with an expressed objective of revenue maximization, adopted the LAB auction for its upcoming 3G spectrum
auction, rather than the seemingly superior HRB auction.
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1. Introduction
In 2008, the government of India announced that
radio spectrum for 3G mobile services would be auc-
tioned in 2009. The 2.1 GHz spectrum is to be sold
as paired spectrum (2 × 5 MHz blocks) in each of
22 regions covering India. There are one to four lots
available in each region, and each bidder can obtain
at most one lot per region. The government’s stated
objective for the auction emphasizes revenue maxi-
mization rather than efﬁciency. In December 2008, the
government announced the chosen auction design:
a discrete clock auction with lowest-accepted-bid
(LAB) pricing and provisional winners (Ministry of
Communications and Information Technology 2008).
Here we examine the equilibrium properties of such
an auction in a simpliﬁed setting. As a comparison,
we analyze a discrete clock auction with highest-
rejected-bid (HRB) pricing and exit bids. This for-
mat is often used in high-stakes auctions in practice
(Ausubel and Cramton 2004).
Interestingly, with proﬁt-maximizing bidders, we
ﬁnd the HRB auction dominates the LAB auction in
both efﬁciency and revenues. The HRB with exit bids
is fully efﬁcient, because it is a dominant strategy to
bid up to one’s valuation. In contrast, LAB with pro-
visional winners has differential shading, because a
provisional winner shades her bid, whereas a provi-
sional loser does not. This differential shading cre-
ates an inefﬁciency and reduces revenues. Given this
strong theoretical result, it may seem odd that India
chose the LAB format.
One potential explanation comes from behavioral
economics. If bidders anticipate the regret of losing at
a proﬁtable price, they may be reluctant to shade bids
as a provisional winner. This fear of losing has been
shown to explain overbidding in ﬁrst-price, sealed-
bid auctions (Engelbrecht-Wiggans 1989; Filiz-Ozbay
and Ozbay 2007; Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok
2007, 2008). Risk aversion is an alternative explana-
tion for overbidding, but has little empirical support
(Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok 2009). Delgado et al.
(2008) provide a neurological foundation that fear of
losing, not joy of winning, is the source of overbid-
ding in ﬁrst-price auctions. Loss aversion with a refer-
ence point of winning (Koszegi and Rabin 2006, Lange
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of losing. When we extend the standard theory to
include a fear of losing, we ﬁnd that if bidders’ fear
of losing is sufﬁciently strong, then the LAB auction
revenue dominates the HRB auction. This result pro-
vides an explanation for India’s selection of a seem-
ingly inferior auction format.
Most theoretical papers on clock auctions assume
a continuous clock for convenience. In practice, clock
auctions use a discrete price clock, because these auc-
tions typically are conducted on the Internet, and
communication is not sufﬁciently reliable to bind bid-
ders to higher prices with the continuous passage
of time. With discrete bid levels, the two predomi-
nant pricing rules, lowest accepted bid and highest
rejected bid, are distinct, and the auction designer
must select a pricing rule as well as other elements of
the design. Currently, there is little literature for the
auction designer to turn to for help with this issue.
There are a limited number of papers investigat-
ing auctions with discrete bid levels. These papers
focus on explaining bidding behavior. Chwe (1989)
studied the ﬁrst-price auction with discrete bid lev-
els and showed that the expected revenue is less
than its continuous counterpart. Mathews and Sen-
gupta (2008) analyzed a sealed-bid, second-price auc-
tion with discrete bids.
More closely related is the work that considers
choices of bid levels in ascending auctions. Rothkopf
and Harstad (1994) is an important early contribu-
tion, determining optimal bid levels that maximize
expected revenue in an oral auction. The paper also
introduces the trade-off between auction duration and
bid increments. David et al. (2007) extend the model
of Rothkopf and Harstad and ﬁnd that decreasing bid
increments are optimal. Although the pricing rule in
our paper is the same as in Rothkopf and Harstad
(1994), the auction formats have important differ-
ences, which result in signiﬁcantly different bidding
behavior.
We consider a discrete clock auction with two pric-
ing rules: highest rejected bid and lowest accepted
bid. Bidders have independent private values and
unit demands. We ﬁrst analyze bidding behavior in
an HRB auction. This is our benchmark for compar-
ing performance with the LAB auction. The HRB auc-
tion is a useful benchmark because of its simplicity, its
desirable properties (efﬁciency and truth dominance),
and its use in practice. In contrast, the LAB auction
forces bidders to engage in difﬁcult trade-offs. We are
only able to solve for equilibrium bidding behavior
in a simpliﬁed setting. Nonetheless, we show that an
LAB auction is generally inefﬁcient. Despite this inef-
ﬁciency, the LAB auction can yield higher revenues
if bidders anticipate the regret of losing at proﬁtable
prices, and therefore engage in less bid shading than
a bidder focused solely on proﬁt maximization.
2. Discrete Clock Auction with
Unit Demand
There are K identical items for sale to N risk-neutral
bidders indexed by i = 1     N, where N>K . The
seller values the items at zero. Bidder i demands
at most one item. Her private valuation for the item
is xi, which is independently drawn from the distri-
bution F with associated density function f on the
interval [0,1]. (We use the independent private val-
ues model for simplicity. Our main results extend to
a model with afﬁliated values.) Bidder i’s payoff if
she wins the item is xi − mi, where mi is bidder i’s
payment and zero otherwise.
Before the auction starts, the seller announces a vec-
tor of bid levels, P = P0 P 1     P T−1 , where Pt is the
clock price at round t for t = 1 2     T − 1, and T
is the number of bid levels. The clock price increases
every round so that P0 <P 1 < ···<P T−1. Deﬁne the
bid increment in round t as  t = Pt − Pt−1 for t =
1 2     T −1. Assume that P0 = 0 and PT−1 = 1. The
auction begins in round 1 at a price P1. In round t, bid-
der i chooses either to bid at the current clock price,
qit =1, or to exit, qit =0. Once a bidder exits, she can-
not bid again. Let Qt =
 N
i=1qit be total demand in
round t. If there is excess demand, Qt >K, the auc-
tion proceeds to the next round. The auction ends in
the round t such that Qt ≤K.
2.1. Highest Rejected Bid with Exit Bids
In the HRB format (highest rejected bid with exit
bids), if bidder i exits in round t, the bidder can sub-
mit an exit bid—a price between Pt−1 and Pt at which
she wants to exit. In round t such that Qt = K, the
items are awarded to the K active bidders and the
ﬁnal price is the highest exit bid among the inactive
bidders. If Qt <K , the items are awarded to the Qt
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the  K − Qt)-highest exit bids. The ﬁnal price is the
 K −Qt +1 -highest exit bid.
Proposition 1. In the HRB auction, truthful bidding
(bidding up to one’s valuation) is a weakly dominant strat-
egy.Therefore, the HRB auction yields an efﬁcient alloca-
tion.Each of the  K -highest valuation bidders wins and
pays the  K +1 -highest valuation.
This result follows immediately from the unit
demand setting and the ability to submit exit bids
at actual valuations. Unit demand guarantees that
each winner pays the Vickrey price, thereby inducing
truthful bidding. Because all bidders bid truthfully,
the items are awarded to the bidders who value them
the most.
2.2. Lowest Accepted Bid with Provisional
Winners
In the LAB format (lowest accepted bid with pro-
visional winners), if there is excess demand in any
round, the seller randomly selects K provisional win-
ners for the next round from active bidders and ranks
them from K to one (highest rank is given priority).
Other remaining active bidders are designated as pro-
visional losers (a rank of 0) for the next round. Each
bidder is automatically assigned a rank in round 1.
The auction ends if there is no excess demand.
The items are awarded to the active bidders and the
remaining items are awarded to the inactive provi-
sional winner in the current round with the highest
rank, and so on until all items are sold. Because bid-
ders are not allowed to submit exit bids, the ﬁnal
price and bids are restricted to clock prices. The ﬁnal
price is uniform and determined by the  K -highest
winner’s bid. If Qt = K, the ﬁnal price is Pt, and if
Qt <K, the ﬁnal price is Pt−1. Notice that the ranking
is relevant in determining the allocation only when
Qt <K , because then there is excess supply at the
ﬁnal price Pt−1. Let  ≡  0 1     K  be the set of all
possible ranks and t ≡  Xt  Xt ∈t  be the set of all
possible bidder’s ranking histories up from round 1
to round t. Let Rit ∈  denote bidder i’s rank in
round t and Hit ≡  Ri1 R i2     R it  ∈  t be a vector
of bidder i’s ranking history from round 1 to round t.
Bidder i’s ranking history Hit is known only to the
bidder i.
One important difference between the LAB auction
described here and an ascending bid auction with the
Table 1 LAB Auction with Three Bidders and Two Items in Round t
Bidder 1 Bidder 2 Bidder 3
Case (R1t =0) (R2t =1) (R3t =2) Outcome
1 Bid Bid Bid Proceed to round t +1, and
provisional winners are
reselected
2 Bid Bid Exit Bidders 1 and 2 win, and the
ﬁnal price is Pt
3 Bid Exit Bid Bidders 1 and 3 win, and the
ﬁnal price is Pt
4Exit Bid Bid Bidders 2 and 3 win, and the
ﬁnal price is Pt
5 Bid Exit Exit Bidders 1 and 3 win, and the
ﬁnal price is Pt−1
6 Exit Bid Exit Bidders 2 and 3 win, and the
ﬁnal price is Pt−1
7 Exit Exit Bid Bidders 2 and 3 win, and the
ﬁnal price is Pt−1
8 Exit Exit Exit Bidders 2 and 3 win, and the
ﬁnal price is Pt−1
same pricing rule is that in the LAB auction, a provi-
sional winner must keep topping her own bid to be
eligible to bid in subsequent rounds. In contrast, in an
ascending bid auction with LAB, being a provisional
winner is counted as being active. Therefore, a provi-
sional winner does not need to bid to be eligible to
bid in the subsequent rounds.
To better illustrate the LAB pricing rule with rank-
ing, consider an auction with three bidders and two
items for sale. Suppose all bidders bid in round t−1,
and bidders 2 and 3 are selected as provisional win-
ners with ranks of 1 and 2, respectively, whereas bid-
der 1 is a provisional loser. In round t, eight possible
combinations of bids and corresponding allocations
and ﬁnal prices are shown in Table 1. If all bidders bid
(Case 1), the auction proceeds to round t + 1 with a
price of Pt+1, and all bidders are assigned new ranks.
Regardless of ranking, if there are exactly two active
bidders (Cases 2–4), they win the items at the current
clock price Pt. If there is only one active bidder, which
creates an excess supply at the current clock price Pt
(Cases 5–7), the item is awarded to the active bidder
and an inactive provisional winner with highest rank
at the previous clock price Pt−1. Finally, if there is no
active bidder (Case 8), bidders 2 and 3 who hold the
highest ranks win at the previous clock price Pt−1.
Lemma 1. For K ≥ 1, in any round t>s+1 with any
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This lemma simply states that a bidder with a valu-
ation less than Ps+1 never bids at a price Ps+2 or above.
In some situations, a bidder may take a risk by bid-
ding in round s+1 at a price Ps+1, which is higher than
her valuation, in the hope that there will be excess
supply and she will consequently win the item at the
previous clock price Ps. When she ﬁnds out that the
auction actually continues to round s+2, it is a dom-
inant strategy to exit immediately regardless of her
ranking because the lowest possible ﬁnal price is Ps+1,
which is still higher than her valuation.
Lemma 2. For K ≥ 1, in round t = 1 2     T − 1
with any ranking history Hit ∈ t, a provisional loser with
valuation xi bids if xi ≥ Pt.For K>1, in round t =
1 2     T−1 with some ranking history Hit ∈ t,ap r o -
visional loser with valuation xi <P t bids in round t if xi
is sufﬁciently close to Pt.
For a provisional loser, exiting yields a payoff of
zero, whereas bidding yields a positive expected pay-
off as long as her valuation is above the current clock
price. Thus, a provisional loser never exits if her valu-
ation exceeds the current clock price. For some rank-
ing history, a provisional loser may bid at a price level
above her valuation because there is a positive prob-
ability that less than K − 1 bids are submitted, and
that by bidding she can win the item at the previous
clock price, which is below her valuation. However,
such a strategy entails a risk of winning the item at a
price higher than her valuation. Because a provisional
loser’s valuation is closer to Pt, the negative payoff
she may receive if the auction continues is smaller,
whereas the positive payoff in case that she wins is
larger. Therefore, a provisional loser who has a valua-
tion closer to Pt may ﬁnd that bidding is more attrac-
tive. If she does not win, she will exit in round t +1,
according to Lemma 1.
Consider the example in Table 1. Suppose bidder 1
has a valuation between Pt−1 and Pt. If she bids and
bidders 2 and 3 exit, as in Case 5, which has a posi-
tive probability of occurring, bidder 1 wins the item
at Pt−1, gaining a positive payoff. If bidder 1 bids and
either bidder 2 or bidder 3 bid, as in Cases 2 or 3,
bidder 1 wins the item at Pt, receiving a negative pay-
off. If all bidders bid, bidder 1 will exit according to
Lemma 1.
Lemma 3. For K ≥ 1, there exists a round t ≤ s with
some ranking history Hit ∈  t such that a provisional
winner with a valuation xi ≥ Ps exits if xi is sufﬁciently
close to Ps.
Intuitively, a provisional winner faces the ﬁrst-price
incentive—an incentive to keep the price low—which
results in exiting before her valuation is reached.
A provisional winner can win the item at a lower
price if she exits, but she risks losing at a proﬁtable
price because exiting is irrevocable. In contrast, if she
stays in the auction, her probability of winning the
item increases and so does the expected ﬁnal price
she pays. Hence, a provisional winner may ﬁnd that
exiting yields higher expected payoff than bidding.
In addition, a provisional winner with higher rank
faces less risk of losing when exiting because a greater
number of new bids are required to displace her pro-
visional winning bid. Consequently, there is some
ranking history such that a provisional winner with a
particular valuation bids if her rank is less than r, but
one with the same valuation exits if her rank is equal
to or greater than r.
In the scenario in Table 1, bidder 2, who is a pro-
visional winner, faces a trade-off between bidding
and exiting. Suppose bidder 1 will bid with certainty.
By exiting, bidder 2 may win at the price Pt−1 if bid-
der 3 exits (Case 5), but she will lose if bidder 3 stays
in. In contrast, by bidding, bidder 2 may win at the
higher price Pt if bidder 3 exits (Case 2).
Proposition 2. The LAB auction is inefﬁcient.
There are two sources of inefﬁciency: discrete bid
levels and asymmetric bidding behavior. First, dis-
crete bid levels may prevent bidders from expressing
a difference in their valuations. Any auction with dis-
crete bid levels is generally inefﬁcient. As the size of
bid increments becomes small, so does the difference
between the HRB and LAB pricing rules. The differ-
ence in efﬁciency is smaller as well. Second, although
bidders and their bidding strategies are symmetric,
asymmetric bidding behavior is introduced by nam-
ing and ranking provisional winners as discussed in
Lemmas 2 and 3. In some situations, a bidder with a
particular valuation bids if she is a provisional loser,
but in the same circumstances, she exits if she is a
provisional winner. Differential bid shading is exhib-
ited among provisional winners, and bidding above
valuation is found among provisional losers. These
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Exit bids in the HRB auction overcome both sources
of inefﬁciency of the LAB auction. In the HRB auction,
there is no bid shading, and all value differences are
expressed.
3. Equilibrium Characterization with
One Item and Two Bidders
To further characterize equilibrium behavior in the
LAB auction, it is necessary to simplify the setting to
one item and two bidders (1 and 2). These assump-
tions are maintained through §8. Although this set-
ting is limiting, it will provide intuition for cases with
more items and more bidders.
With two bidders and a single item, there are two
possible ranks: a provisional winner or a provisional
loser. Once a bidder knows her rank, she can infer
that her opponent’s rank is the other. Speciﬁcally, for
all t, H1t is the complement of H2t and vice versa.
The auction ends when at least one bidder exits. If
in round t only one bidder exits, the active bidder
receives the item and pays Pt. If both bidders exit in
round t, the provisional winner in round t gets the
item at a price of Pt−1.
Deﬁnition 1. Bidder i follows a straightforward
bidding strategy in round t when
qit xi =
 
1 xi ≥Pt 
0 xi <P t 
Lemma 4. For a bidder with any rank, bidding above
her valuation is a weakly dominated strategy.For a pro-
visional loser, bidding straightforwardly is a weakly domi-
nant strategy.
As discussed in Lemma 2, a provisional loser bids
if her valuation is higher than the current clock price.
In the one-item case, the ﬁnal price is at least the cur-
rent clock price if one or more bids are submitted. In
contrast to the case with two or more items, it is not
proﬁtable for a bidder with any rank to bid when the
current clock price is above her valuation.
The fact that a provisional loser bids straightfor-
wardly greatly simpliﬁes the analysis. To construct an
equilibrium, we need to solve for the bidding behav-
ior of a provisional winner. A provisional winner’s
bidding strategy depends not only on her valuation,
but also on the history of the opponent’s ranks. For
instance, a provisional winner may exit when a rank-
ing history implies that a provisional loser’s valuation
has a lower bound less than the next clock price. In
contrast, a provisional winner will continue to com-
pete when an inferred provisional loser’s valuation is
higher than the current clock price. This dependence
on the history of rankings implies that even with the
same realized valuation, different ranking histories
may produce different allocations and ﬁnal prices.
Lemma 5. In any round t = 1 2     T − 1, a pro-
visional winner’s expected gain from exiting—expected
payoff from exiting less expected payoff from bidding—is
decreasing in her valuation.
Simply put, a provisional winner’s bidding strat-
egy is monotonic in valuation. Intuitively, if an opti-
mal strategy of a provisional winner with valuation
x in any round t is bidding (exiting), it is an opti-
mal strategy of a provisional winner with valuation
x  >x x   <x to bid (exit) in round t as well.
Let ˆ xt   t →  0 1  be a critical valuation for a bid-
ding strategy in round t. This function ˆ xt Hit  indi-
cates that in round t, a bidder with a valuation
at least ˆ xt Hit  will bid, and one with valuation less
than ˆ xt Hit  will exit. Moreover, if Pt−1 < ˆ xt Hit <P t,
ˆ xt Hit  is a valuation of a bidder who is indifferent
between bidding and exiting in round t for a ranking
history Hit.
According to Lemma 4, the provisional loser bids
straightforwardly regardless of the ranking history.
Therefore, for any ranking history Hit ∈ t such that
Rit =0, ˆ xt Hit =Pt.
In each round, a bidder applies Bayesian updating
to the lower bound of her opponent’s valuation and
uses this lower bound to determine an optimal strat-
egy. For example, suppose in round t with bidder 1’s
ranking history of H1t, bidder 1 is a provisional loser
and bidder 2 is a provisional winner. Suppose both
of them have a valuation above Pt+1 and bid at Pt.I n
round t +1, bidder 1 is selected as a provisional win-
ner, and she makes an inference that bidder 2’s val-
uation must be in  ˆ xt H2t  1 . If, for instance, Pt+1 <
ˆ xt H2t <P t+2, bidder 1, aware that bidder 2 has a val-
uation higher than the current clock price and follows
























































































































































































.Cramton and Sujarittanonta: Pricing Rule in a Clock Auction
Decision Analysis 7(1), pp. 40–57, ©2010 INFORMS 45
The lower bound is at least the previous clock price
because no bidder bids above her valuation according
to Lemma 4. It can be higher than the previous clock
price when an equilibrium strategy suggests that the
critical valuation of the provisional winner is higher
than the previous clock price, and she in turn bids.
Importantly, being a provisional winner reveals more
information on valuation to the opponent than being
a provisional loser.
Let lt Hjt  ≡ max Pt−1  ˆ xt−1 Hj t−1   be an inferred
lower bound of bidder j’s valuation in round t as
a function of a ranking history Hjt. Consider a pro-
visional winner i in round t with valuation xi >P t.
Let  it qit x i Hit  be bidder i’s expected payoffs in
round t when submitting a decision qit ∈ 0 1  given a
ranking history Hit, where 0 and 1 correspond to exit-
ing and bidding, respectively. If lt Hjt  ≥ Pt, a provi-
sional winner’s dominant strategy is bidding if xi ≥Pt
and exiting otherwise. Next, consider the case where
lt Hjt  ∈  Pt−1 P t . Let  i t+1 be bidder i’s expected
payoff in round t+1 if the auction proceeds to round
t + 1. Bidder i’s payoffs of bidding and exiting in
round t are, respectively,
 it qit =1 x i Hit ≡ xi −Pt 
F P t −F l t Hjt  
1−F l t Hjt  
+ i t+1 
 it qit =0 x i Hit ≡ xi −Pt−1 
F P t −F l t Hjt  
1−F l t Hjt  
 
It is an optimal strategy to bid if  it qit =
1 x i Hit  ≥  it qit = 0 x i Hit  and exit if  it qit =
1 x i Hit <  it qit =0 x i Hit . The value of ˆ xt Hit  can
be either equal to a clock price or between two con-
secutive clock prices. It is equal to a clock price, say Ps
for s ≥t,i f it qit =1 P s Hit ≥ it qit =0 P s Hit  and
 it qit = 1 P s −   Hit <  it qit = 0 P s −   Hit , where
  is a small positive number. The value of ˆ xt Hit  will
be between Ps and Ps+1 if  it qit = 1  ˆ xt Hit  Hit  =
 it qit = 0  ˆ xt Hit  Hit  and ˆ xt Hit  ∈  Ps P s+1 .W e
assign ˆ xt Hit  =  if it is optimal for a provi-
sional winner with any valuation to exit, regardless
of the ranking history. Obviously, ˆ xT−1 Hi T−1  = 
for any Hi T−1 ∈T−1.
Proposition 3. An equilibrium of a discrete clock auc-
tion with LAB is characterized by ˆ xt Hit  for any Hit ∈
 t and for t = 1 2     T − 1.In round t with a rank-
ing history Hit ∈ t, bidder i bids if her valuation is in
 ˆ xt Hit  1  and exits if her valuation is in  0  ˆ xt Hit  .
Figure 1 Strategy of a Provisional Winner with Valuation x ∈ Pt P t+1 







with a Fixed Bid Increment and
Uniform Valuations
To further characterize equilibrium behavior, it is
helpful to assume a ﬁxed bid increment and assume
that valuations are uniformly distributed on [0,1].
Thus,  t =   = 1/ T − 1  for all t and F x = x.W e
maintain these assumptions through §8.
Lemma 6. In any round t ≤ s − 2 with a ranking his-
tory Hit ∈t, a provisional winner in round t with a val-
uation x ∈ Ps P s+1  always bids.
Assuming ﬁxed bid increments and uniform val-
uations greatly simpliﬁes the equilibrium derivation,
because we only need to solve for the provisional
winner’s bidding behaviors in the two rounds below
her valuation. Figure 1 summarizes the strategy of a
bidder with valuation x ∈ Pt P t+1  when she is a pro-
visional winner. According to Lemma 6, if she is a
provisional winner in any round 1 to t − 2, she will
bid. She may bid or exit if she is a provisional winner
in round t − 1o rt depending on her valuation and
ranking history. By Lemma 4, she will exit in round
t +1 regardless.
Proposition 4. Inefﬁciency in the LAB auction can be
reduced by smaller bid increments.
In this setting, efﬁciency suffers from discrete bid
levels and differential bid shading. However, accord-
ing to Lemma 6, the amount of bid shading is limited
to only two bid levels. Therefore, smaller bid incre-
ments reduce the absolute amount of bid shading as
well as constraints on expressing value differences.
5. An Example with Four Bid Levels
To get a better sense of the equilibrium, consider
an example with two bidders, one item, and four
bid levels: P =  0 1/3 2/3 1  or   = 1/3. Solving for
an equilibrium yields a provisional winner’s critical
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Table 2 Valuations of a Provisional Winner Whose Optimal Strategy
Is Bidding in Each Round and Ranking History
Round Price Ranking history Valuation
11 /3  1   4/5 1 
22 /3  1 1  None
 0 1   2/3 1 
3 1 Any None
ˆ x2 1 1  =  , and ˆ x3 Hi3  = for any Hi3 ∈ 3. The
bidding strategy of the provisional winner is summa-
rized in Table 2.
A bidder never bids above her valuation. In
round 1, if a provisional winner has a valuation less
than 4/5, she will exit. To show how the ranking
history affects inference of the lower bound of an
opponent’s valuation and bidding behavior, consider
bidder 1 with valuation x1 and bidder 2 with valu-
ation x2, where x1 >x 2 ≥ 4/5. Suppose she is a pro-
visional winner in round 2. If the ranking history is
H12 =  0 1 , the fact that bidder 2 bids in round 1
implies that her valuation is higher than 4/5, and thus
she will bid in round 2. Because bidder 1 knows that
bidder 2 will bid and her valuation is above the cur-
rent clock price as well, it is a dominant strategy to
bid. In contrast, if the ranking history is H12 =  1 1 ,
bidder 1 infers that bidder 2’s valuation is higher than
1/3. Bidder 1 thus exits and loses. Bidder 1 would
have done better if the ranking history had been
 0 1 . The allocation in this case is inefﬁcient.
This example shows that being a provisional loser
provides a bidder a chance to learn about her oppo-
nent’s valuation and that a ranking history affects a
provisional winner’s bidding strategy. It is this history
dependence that makes the equilibrium calculation so
difﬁcult. With four bid levels, the expected revenue is
0.278, which is lower than that of the HRB auction,
which is equal to 1/3.
6. Expected Revenue with
Proﬁt-Maximizing Bidders
In this section, we continue to assume that there is
a single item and two bidders whose valuations are
uniformly distributed on  0 1 . There are T bid levels,
equally spaced. Because all bidders bid truthfully in
the HRB auction, the expected revenue is RHRB =1/3.
Calculating an expected revenue of the LAB auction
is tedious because all possible histories and associ-
ated outcomes have to be considered. Thus, the prob-
lem grows exponentially in the number of bid levels,
making derivation of an equilibrium with an arbitrary
number of bid levels impossible. We can, however,
calculate expected revenue for small T. We also can
calculate revenue in the limit as the number of bid
levels goes to inﬁnity (bid increments become small).
The limit result comes from the limit of upper and
lower bounds on revenue. Because both limits con-
verge to the same thing, the equilibrium expected rev-
enue must converge as well.
Lemma 7. Suppose all bidders follow the straightfor-




 T −2  2T +3 





A rational bidder infers a lower bound of her oppo-
nent’s valuation from a ranking history and a previ-
ous clock price. The inferred opponent’s valuation is
at the previous clock price unless a ranking history
implies that it is higher. The higher the lower bound,
the less the bid shading. Consider a maximum shad-
ing strategy—in every round, a provisional winner
infers that a lower bound of the provisional loser’s
valuation is a previous clock price. Therefore, the low-
est inference of lower bound that leads to the highest
amount of shading constitutes the maximum shading
strategy, as the name suggests. Explicitly, consider a
bidder with valuation xt ∈  Pt P t+1 , where t ≥ 2. In
any round s ≤ t − 2, she will bid regardless of her
ranking according to Lemma 6. In round t, if she is a
provisional winner, she will exit because
 it qit =1 x i Hit  ≡  xi −Pt 
 




 xi −Pt 
 
1−F P t−1 
<  x i −Pt−1 
 
1−F P t−1 
≡  it qit =0 x i Hit  
Given that she will exit in round t, in round t −1w e
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Lemma 8. Suppose a provisional winner follows the
maximum shading strategy and a provisional loser follows
a straightforward bidding strategy.For T ≥5, the expected




T 3 −195T 2 +397T −549
150 T −1 3  
In addition, limT→ RMS
LAB T =RHRB.
Proposition 5. The expected revenue of the LAB auc-
tion converges to that of an HRB auction as bid increments
become small—as the number of bid levels goes to inﬁnity.
The expected revenue of the LAB auction when
bidders follow a straightforward bidding strategy is
an upper bound and the expected revenue of the
LAB auction when a provisional winner follows a
maximum shading strategy is a lower bound of the
expected revenue of the LAB auction with proﬁt-
maximizing bidders. Because the upper and lower
bounds converge to 1/3, the expected revenue of the
LAB auction converges to 1/3 as well.
With proﬁt-maximizing bidders, the expected rev-
enues of the LAB auction with four to seven bid levels
are as follows.
T 4567 
Expected revenue 0.278 0.301 0.311 0.317 0.333
We see that the expected revenue is increasing in
the number of bid levels at a decreasing rate. We
conjecture that the LAB auction always yields lower
expected revenue than the HRB auction.
7. Extension to Bidders with an
Anticipated Loser’s Regret at
Proﬁtable Prices
In this section, we extend the model to include the
possibility that bidders’ anticipated regret of losing at
proﬁtable prices will cause them to bid more aggres-
sively than under pure proﬁt maximization. Again we
consider the case with two bidders and a single item.
Valuations are uniformly distributed on  0 1  with T
equally spaced bid levels.
There is strong support for this view in sealed-bid,
ﬁrst-price auctions (Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok
2007, 2008; Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay 2007; Delgado
et al. 2008). It seems plausible that the same behav-
ioral bias—caring more about the negative emotion
coming from losing at proﬁtable prices than the
positive emotion of extra proﬁt from successful bid
shading—may exist in the dynamic context. In a sep-
arate paper, we examine this possibility in the exper-
imental laboratory (Cramton et al. 2009). Here, we
present the basic theory.
The behavioral theory posits that bidders systemat-
ically put too much weight on proﬁts lost from los-
ing at proﬁtable prices and too little weight on proﬁts
gained from successful bid shading. In our context, it
is the bids of a provisional winner that are affected
by this asymmetric treatment of proﬁts, because only
the provisional winner has an incentive to bid below
her valuation.
Deﬁne    it qit q jt R it  as bidder i‘s payoff if the auc-
tion ends given that bidder i submits qit, bidder j
submits qjt, and Rit is bidder i’s rank in round t.
Recognizing anticipated loser’s regret, we deﬁne bid-
der i’s payoff function as
   it qit =1 q jt =0 R it =1 =xi −Pt 
   it qit =0 q jt =1 R it =1 
=− max
 
0 E t     i t+1 qit =1 q jt =1 R it =1  
 
 
   it qit =0 q jt =0 R it =1 =xi −Pt−1 
   it qit =1 q jt =0 R it =0 =xi −Pt 
   it qit =0 q jt =1 R it =0 
=− max
 
0 E t     i t+1 qit =1 q jt =1 R it =0  
 
 
   it qit =0 q jt =0 R it =0 
=− max
 
0 E t     i t+1 qit =1 q jt =0 R it =0  
 
 
where   is the regret coefﬁcient indicating the strength
of anticipated regret. In this section, assume that 0 ≤
 <1.
Given this payoff structure, it is still a weakly
dominant strategy for a provisional loser to bid
straightforwardly. Consider a provisional loser with
a valuation between Pt and Pt+1. In round t + 1, she
could win only at an unproﬁtable price by bidding.
Hence, she does not have regret, so she exits. There-
fore, it is a weakly dominated strategy to bid above
her valuation. Moreover, exiting below her valuation
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Figure 2 Relationship Between the Critical Regret Coefﬁcient and the
Number of Bid Levels








penalizes the bidder even more than in the no-regret
case, resulting in a negative expected payoff, whereas
bidding yields a positive expected payoff.
For a provisional winner who faces a trade-off
between exiting and bidding, exiting is now less
attractive because she anticipates that she will regret if
losing. A provisional winner is expected to bid more
aggressively when anticipated regret is more intense.
Lemma 9. Suppose a provisional winner follows the
maximum shading strategy and a provisional loser follows
the straightforward bidding strategy.For T ≥ 5 and 0 ≤
 <1, the expected revenue is given by
˜ R
MS
LAB T    =
1










2 −23T −9   
In addition, limT→  ˜ RMS
LAB T   =RHRB 
As in the no-regret case, ˜ RMS
LAB T    is a lower
bound of the expected revenue of the LAB auction
with fear of losing. The upper bound is the same
as the no-regret case in Lemma 7. Therefore, the
expected revenue of the LAB auction with fear of los-
ing converges to 1/3.
Nonetheless, in the interesting case of ﬁnite T as
in any real auction, if the regret coefﬁcient is sufﬁ-
ciently large, the LAB auction yields higher expected
revenue than the HRB auction. The necessary condi-
tion is given in Proposition 6.
Proposition 6. Suppose a provisional winner follows
the maximum shading strategy and a provisional loser fol-
lows the straightforward bidding strategy.If T ≥7 and
1









LAB T   ≥RHRB.
Deﬁne  ∗ as the critical regret coefﬁcient such that
˜ RMS
LAB T  ∗  = RHRB. Figure 2 shows the relationship
between the critical regret coefﬁcient and the num-
ber of bid levels. With six bid levels, a regret coefﬁ-
cient of one guarantees that the LAB auction yields
higher revenue than the HRB auction. If T ≥ 7 and
  is sufﬁciently close to one, we can be certain that
the expected revenue of the LAB auction is higher.
In §8, we show that the actual regret coefﬁcient (as
opposed to the critical regret coefﬁcient  ∗) with six
bid levels that makes the LAB and HRB auctions have
equal revenues is 0.66, not 1.
8. An Example with Four and Six Bid
Levels and Fear of Losing
By using a similar solution technique as used in §5,
we can explicitly calculate a perfect Bayesian equilib-
rium with fear of losing for a small number of bid
Table 3 Valuation of a Provisional Winner Whose Optimal Strategy Is
Bidding in Each Round and Ranking History When 0≤ <1
Round Price Ranking history Valuation
11 /3  1 
 
2/3+
2 1−  
15 1+  
 1
 
22 /3  1 1  None
 0 1   2/3 1 
3 1 Any None
Table 4 Valuation of a Provisional Winner Whose Optimal Strategy Is
Bidding in Each Round and Ranking History When  ≥1
Round Price Ranking history Valuation




3 1+  
 1

22 /3  1 1  None
 0 1   2/3 1 
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levels. Consider the case of four bid levels. A provi-
sional winner’s bidding strategies when 0≤ <1 and
 ≥1 are as shown in Tables 3 and 4, respectively.
The equilibrium strategy with  <1 is similar
to the no-regret case, but the critical valuation is
instead a function of the regret coefﬁcient. Moreover,
in round 1, a provisional winner with any valuation
below 2/3 exits if  <1, but if   ≥ 1, a provisional
winner with valuation close to 2/3 may bid. In both
cases, the larger the regret coefﬁcient, the lesser the
amount of shading and the higher the expected rev-
enue. Expected revenues when  <1 and  ≥1a r e
˜ RLAB 4   =

   
   
15+19 
54 1+  
 <1 
11 3 +27 2 +25 +5
27 1+  3  ≥1 
Similar calculations can be done for the case of
six bid levels. Figure 3 plots the expected revenue
from the LAB auction with T = 4 (solid) and T = 6
(dashed) as a function of the regret coefﬁcient. Rev-
enue increases with the fear of losing, and exceeds
the revenue of 1/3 from the HRB auction if the fear
of losing is sufﬁciently strong. The x-axis is drawn
at 1/3, so points above the axis are instances where
the LAB auction yields higher revenues than the HRB
auction. With four bid levels, the LAB auction yields
higher expected revenue than the HRB auction if  >
1 52; with six bid levels, the LAB auction yields higher
expected revenue than the HBR auction if  >0 66.
Because six or more bid levels is typical in practice,
we conclude that the LAB auction may yield higher
revenues than the HRB auction with plausible levels
of fear of losing.
9. Lowest Accepted Bid with
Exit Bids
Our version of lowest accepted bid is motivated from
India’s 3G auction. A variation which may be prefer-
able is the lowest accepted bid with exit bids (LABx).
This is identical to HRB in that exit bids are allowed,
but the price is set by the lowest accepted bid, so there
is a ﬁrst-price incentive to shade one’s bid.1
Assume that there are N bidders whose valuations
are distributed on the interval  0 1  with the distri-
bution function F. If there is excess demand in any
round, the auction proceeds to the next round. If a
bidder exits in round t, the bidder can submit an exit
bid—a price between Pt−1 and Pt. The ﬁnal price is
1 Another variation is the pricing rule analyzed in Rothkopf and
Harstad (1994) and David et al. (2007). Such a pricing rule is
dominated in both revenue and efﬁciency by highest rejected bid
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determined by the lowest accepted exit bid. That is,
in round t such that Qt =K, the auction ends and the
ﬁnal price is Pt, and the items are awarded to active
bidders. If Qt <K, the  K−Qt -highest exit bid deter-
mines the ﬁnal price, and the items are awarded to the
Qt active bidders and exiting bidders with the highest
K −Qt exit bids.
Let Mt = M1 M 2     M t  be a vector indicating the
number of active bidders from round 1 to round t,
where Mt ∈  2     N  is the number of active bid-
ders in round t, and M1 ≥ M2 ≥···≥Mt. Let t =
 Mt  Mt ∈ 2     N  M 1 ≥M2 ≥···≥Mt  be the set of
all possible active bidder histories from round 1 to
round t. Assume that the active bidder history Mt is
common knowledge.
Given the history, the bidder forms a belief of
a lower bound of active bidders’ valuations and
chooses whether to bid or submit an exit bid accord-
ingly. Because it is a dominated strategy to bid above
one’s valuation, the lower bound is at least the previ-
ous clock price.
Let x∗
t   0   ×t →  0 1  be an intermediate val-
uation in round t given a regret coefﬁcient and active
bidder history. Let Bt   0 1 × 0   ×t →  Pt−1 P t 
be an equilibrium exit bid function in round t given
a valuation, regret coefﬁcient, and a history of the
number of active bidders. An equilibrium bidding
strategy is deﬁned by these two functions. That is,
a bidder with valuation x ∈  x∗
t−1   Mt−1  x∗
t   Mt  
exits in round t and submits an exit bid Bt x   Mt .
The equilibrium bidding strategy is illustrated in
Figure 4.
Both x∗
t   Mt  and Bt x   Mt  can be derived iter-
atively from round 1 to round T. In any round t and
any Mt ∈t, bidders infer that their opponents’ valu-
ations are in  x∗
t−1   Mt−1  1 . The exit bid function is
˜ Bt x   z t M t =
1
G s  zt 1− 
  x
zt
sdG s  zt 
1−  
Figure 4 Equilibrium Bidding Strategy in the LABx Auction
Pt Pt–1 Pt+1 Pt+2
…
Exit in round t and
submit Bt(x, , Mt)
Exit in round t+1 and
submit Bt+1(x, α, Mt+1)
…
* xt–1(, Mt–1) * xt+1(, Mt+1) * xt(, Mt)
where zt = x∗
t−1   Mt−1  and G s  zt  = F s zt Mt−1.
The equation x∗
t   Mt  ≡ x∗ can be obtained by solv-
ing the condition ˜ Bt x∗   x∗
t−1   Mt−1  Mt =Pt for x∗.
Note that the equilibrium exit bid function can be
rewritten as Bt x   Mt ≡ ˜ Bt x   x∗
t−1   Mt−1  Mt .
Proposition 7. A symmetric equilibrium is character-
ized by x∗
t   Mt  and Bt x   Mt  for t =1 2     T−1
and for any Mt ∈ t.Deﬁne x∗
0      = 0.In round t
with a history Mt ∈ t, a bidder with valuation x ∈
 x∗
t−1   Mt−1  x∗
t   Mt   exits in round t and submits
an exit bid equal to Bt x   Mt .For t = 1 2     T −1
and for any Mt ∈ t, x∗
t   Mt  is decreasing in  , and
Bt x   Mt  is increasing in x and  .
Proposition 8. The LABx auction is efﬁcient.
Because the bidding strategy is monotonic in valua-
tion and symmetric, the allocation is efﬁcient. The use
of exit bids overcomes both the inefﬁciency arising
from discrete bid levels and the asymmetry created
by ranking.
Proposition 9. Revenue equivalence between HRB
and LABx auctions holds if   = 0.If  >0, the LABx
auction yields higher revenue than the HRB auction.
Because the allocation rules and expected payoffs
of the lowest-valuation bidder of the HRB and LABx
auctions are the same, revenue equivalence immedi-
ately follows when  =0. In contrast to the HRB auc-
tion, in the LABx auction, bidders submit exit bids
below their valuations so that fear of losing at a prof-
itable price impacts the bidding strategy in the LABx
auction. Similar to the ﬁrst-price auction, this fear of
losing reduces the amount of shading, resulting in
higher exit bids relative to the   = 0 case, and thus
implying higher expected revenue.
10. An Example of the LABx Auction
with Four Bid Levels and
Fear of Losing
Assume that there are two bidders and each bidder’s
valuation is uniformly distributed over an interval
 0 1 . In the two-bidder case, an active bidder history
is irrelevant because the auction ends when any bid-
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Table 5 Bidding Strategy of the LABx Auction with Four Bid Levels and
Fear of Losing












3 1+  
 
 2+   1+2  










 2+   1+2  









If  =0 and both bidders bid in round 1, it implies
that both bidders have valuations in  2/3 1 , and thus
no bidder exits in round 2. The expected revenue
when  >0 is given as follows:
˜ RLABx 4   
=
13 7+98 6+314 5+553 4+580 3+361 2+124 +18
27 2+   1+  6  
Expected revenues of the LAB and LABx auctions
with fear of losing with four and six bid levels are
shown in Figure 5. As the number of bid levels
increases, the expected revenue when  >0 decreases.
This is because LABx converges to HRB as the num-
ber of bid levels goes to inﬁnity. The LABx auction
Figure 5 Expected Revenue of the LAB and LABx Auctions with Fear of Losing, T =4 and T =6
T = 4 exit
T = 6 exit
T = 6 no exit
T = 4 no exit
LAB > HRB







achieves maximum revenues when the number of bid
levels is set to two; that is, the ﬁrst-price sealed-bid
auction achieves the maximum revenues when bid-
ders fear losing.
11. Conclusion
The pricing rule is of fundamental importance in
practical auction design. It is now well understood
that the pricing rule impacts both the efﬁciency
and the revenues of the auction. Although there is
an immense literature on the pricing rule in static
(sealed-bid) auctions (ﬁrst price versus second price
in single-unit auctions, and pay as bid versus uniform
price in multiunit auctions) little is known about alter-
native pricing rules in dynamic auctions. This paper
begins to ﬁll that gap.
We ﬁnd that the highest-rejected-bid auction with
exit bids is superior in both efﬁciency and revenues to
the lowest-accepted-bid auction with provisional win-
ners when bidders seek to maximize proﬁts. Given
this, it may seem odd that India, with a stated objec-
tive of revenue maximization, chose the LAB auction.
Behavioral economics provides a plausible expla-
nation for the choice. With the LAB auction, proﬁt-
maximizing bidders engage in bid shading and
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Bidders who fear losing at proﬁtable prices reduce
their bid shading to lessen this risk. Provided the fear
of losing is sufﬁciently strong, the LAB auction rev-
enues exceed those of the HRB auction. Thus, the LAB
auction may achieve India’s primary objective of max-
imizing revenues. However, the LABx is strictly supe-
rior to LAB in all cases in both revenue and efﬁciency.
The use of exit bids eliminates both sources of inef-
ﬁciency in the LAB auction—discrete bid levels and
asymmetric bidding strategies caused by provisional
winners.
In Cramton et al. (2009), we conducted laboratory
experiments to test the theory. The experiments con-
ﬁrm bidding behavior consistent with a signiﬁcant
loser’s regret coefﬁcient. Both the LAB and LABx auc-
tions achieve signiﬁcantly higher revenues than the
HRB auction. Consistent with the theory, bidders in
the HRB auction tend to bid true values, and the
efﬁciency and revenue are as predicted by the the-
ory. With LAB and LABx auctions, the bidders engage
in much less bid shading than is seen in the stan-
dard theory without a fear of losing. This accounts
for the signiﬁcantly higher revenues under the lowest-
accepted-bid pricing rule.
Despite the possibility of higher revenues from the
LAB format, we would recommend against its use
in India or elsewhere. If there are revenue gains, the
gains likely are modest (and tightly bounded as we
have shown). Offsetting these potential revenue gains
are inefﬁciencies. One source of inefﬁciency, which
we have ignored so far, is bidder participation costs.
As we have seen, bidding strategy in the LAB auc-
tion is incredibly complex, even in the simplest cases.
In sharp contrast, bidding strategy in the HRB auc-
tion is simple in simple settings: a bidder of modest
size and with additive values across regions, which
is often a good ﬁrst approximation, can bid straight-
forwardly, raising the bid on each region until the
bidder’s value is reached. The great complexity of
bidding strategy under the LAB format is an impor-
tant reason to favor the strategically simpler and more
efﬁcient HRB format.
Our view is that India would be better off in the
long run if it focused on efﬁcient auctions. Efﬁcient
auctions are much simpler for bidders and still raise
substantial revenues. The long-run revenues of the
state are apt to be highest from a policy that pro-
motes the rapid and efﬁcient development of wire-
less communications. Auction revenues are only one
piece of the overall revenues. For a country like India,
the much more important piece is the promise of
long-term sustainable growth. The rapid and efﬁcient
development of wireless communications will play a
big role in achieving this growth.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. A bidder’s maximization prob-
lem is to choose an optimal exit bid. Consider bidder i with
a valuation xi ∈  Pt P t+1 . Suppose that ˜ x is the  K -highest
competing bid among bidders other than bidder i. First, it
is a weakly dominated strategy to submit an exit bid x  <x i.
Suppose, if ˜ x ≤ x  <x i, her payoff is equal to the one when
she bid her valuation. If x  < ˜ x ≤ xi, she loses and is better
off bidding her valuation. If x  <x i < ˜ x, she loses regardless.
Hence, she cannot be better off bidding x  <x i. Second, it
is also a weakly dominated strategy to submit an exit bid
x  >x i.I f˜ x ≤xi <x  , she receives the same payoff as submit-
ting an exit bid of xi.I fxi < ˜ x ≤x , she wins the item at price
above her valuation and receives a negative payoff. Finally,
if xi <x   < ˜ x, she loses regardless. Thus, she cannot gain by
bidding x  >x i. Therefore, it is a weakly dominant strategy
to submit an exit bid equal to the bidder’s valuation. 
Proof of Lemma 1. In round t>s+1, the ﬁnal price is
at least Pt−1, which exceeds bidder i’s valuation. Winning
the item yields a strictly negative payoff regardless of her
rank, so that she is better off losing. Thus, it is a weakly
dominant strategy to exit immediately in round t to reduce
a chance of winning the item if she is a provisional winner
or to avoid winning at all if she is a provisional loser. 
Proof of Lemma 2. Consider a provisional loser who has
a valuation less than the current clock price. Exiting imme-
diately yields a payoff of zero, whereas bidding yields a
positive expected payoff because she may win the item in
the subsequent round at a proﬁtable price. Thus, a provi-
sional loser will never exit before her valuation is reached.
Next, consider a provisional loser i who has a valuation
xi ∈  Pt−1 P t  in round t. By remaining active, she may be
able to win the item at Pt−1 if fewer than K − 2 bids in
addition to her bid are submitted. However, bidding entails
a risk of winning at a price of Pt, resulting in a negative
payoff. According to Lemma 1, if she bids in round t and
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of her rank. She will bid if the expected payoff of bidding—
the expected payoff if she wins at Pt−1 less the expected
payoff if she wins at Pt—is positive.
She will win the item at Pt when (1) there are at least K−1
bids submitted in round t, (2) she is selected to be a provi-
sional winner of rank L, and (3) less than L bids from provi-
sional losers are submitted in round t +1. Let  it m r Hit 
be the probability that m bidders out of r remaining bidders
excluding bidder i stay active in round t given a ranking
history Hit and  it m r Hit  be the probability that m pro-
visional losers out of r provisional losers bid in round t
given a ranking history Hit.
Suppose there are R bidders remaining in round t. The
provisional loser i’s expected payoff is
 xi −Pt−1 
K−2  
j=0











 i t+1 z j−K+1 Ht∪ L   
The ﬁrst term is the expected payoff when less than K −2
bids are submitted. The second term is the expected payoff
when exactly K −1 bids are submitted and the provisional
loser i wins the item at Pt. The third term is the expected
payoff when the auction continues to round t + 1 and the
provisional loser i wins the item. The last two summations
aggregate probabilities that bidder i is selected as a provi-
sional winner of rank L=1     K, and z=0     L−1 bids
are submitted in round t + 1. The ﬁrst summation in the
third term then aggregates over a chance that at least K bids
are submitted in round t +1.
Because Pt−1 ≤xi <P t and  it m r Hit ≥0, the ﬁrst term
is weakly positive, whereas the second and third terms
are negative. For some ranking history, an expected payoff
when less than K −2 bids are submitted is strictly positive.
Because bidder i’s valuation is closer to Pt, the ﬁrst term
is larger, whereas the other two terms become smaller and
the expected payoff of bidding increases. By using an inter-
mediate valuation xi =Pt, the expected payoff of bidding is
positive. So, if bidder i’s valuation is sufﬁciently close to Pt,
the expected payoff is positive, and as a result, bidding is
proﬁtable for bidder i. 
Proof of Lemma 3. Consider a provisional winner i in
round t with valuation xi ∈  Pt P t+1 . It is optimal to exit
in round t if the expected payoff of exiting exceeds the
expected payoff of bidding. Using the same notations as in
the proof of Lemma 2, suppose there are R bidders remain-
ing in round t, and the ranking history is Hit. Let l be a
provisional winner i’s rank in round t. If her valuation is
close to Pt, she will exit in round t + 1 because a negative
expected payoff arising from winning the item at an unprof-
itable price exceeds an expected payoff of exiting.
It is optimal to exit in round t if
 xi −Pt−1 
l−1  
j=0
 it j R Ht 
> x i −Pt  it K −1 R Ht + xi −Pt−1 
K−2  
j=0
 it j R Ht 
+ xi −Pt 
R  
j=K








· z j −K +1 Ht ∪ L   
The left-hand side is the expected payoff if provisional
winner i exits and less than l bids are submitted. The ﬁrst
term of the right-hand side is the expected payoff if pro-
visional winner i bids and exactly l −1 bids are submitted
so that provisional winner i gets the item at Pt. The second
term of the right-hand side is the expected payoff if fewer
than K −1 bids are submitted so that bidder i gets the item
at Pt−1. The last term is the expected payoff if at least K −1
bids are submitted and the auction continues to round t+1.
Provisional winner i is selected to be a provisional winner
of rank L in round t +1. She then exits and wins the item
at Pt. Assume for now that bidder i exits in round t + 1.
Later, we will use an intermediate valuation Pt so that it is a
dominant strategy for provisional winner i to exit in round
t +1.
Rearranging yields
 xi −Pt−1  it K −1 R Ht 
> x i −Pt  it K −1 R Ht + xi −Pt 
R  
j=K








 i t+1 z j −K +1 Ht ∪ L   
Because xi ∈  Pt P t+1  and  it m r Hit  ≥ 0 for any m, r,
and Hit, both sides of the inequality are positive. For some
ranking history, the probability that K −1 bids are submit-
ted in round t is strictly positive so that the left-hand side
is strictly positive as well. As provisional winner i’s valu-
ation is closer to Pt, the left-hand side is larger while the
right-hand side becomes smaller. By using an intermediate
valuation, xi =Pt, the inequality holds. That is, the expected
payoff of exiting exceeds that of bidding. 
Proof of Proposition 2. According to Lemmas 2 and 3,
provisional losers may bid above their valuations, and
provisional winners may exit before their valuations are
reached. For some ranking history and valuation, a bidder
may bid if she is a provisional loser, but she may exit if
she is a provisional winner. Such an asymmetric bidding
strategy leads to an inefﬁcient allocation. 
Proof of Lemma 4. In the one-item case, the ﬁnal price
is equal to the highest bid. Regardless of her rank, a bidder
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because the ﬁnal price will be at least Pt. Therefore, bidding
above one’s valuation is a weakly dominated strategy.
If a bidder with valuation xi ≥ Pt is a provisional loser
in round t, it is a weakly dominated strategy to exit
because exiting yields a payoff of zero, whereas bidding
may give her a chance to win at a proﬁtable price. Hence,
the optimal strategy for a provisional loser is straightfor-
ward bidding. 
Proof of Lemma 5. To show this, consider a provisional
winner with valuation xi in round t. Let  t Hit  be a prob-
ability that the opponent bids in round s given a ranking
history Hit and  t+1 xi Hit  be an expected payoff in round
t + 1 given a valuation xi and a ranking history Hit. Note
that  t+1 xi Hit  is increasing in xi. A provisional winner’s
expected gain from exiting in round t is given by
Git xi Hit  ≡  xi −Pt−1  t Hit − xi −Pt  t Hit 
− i t+1 xi Hit 
=  Pt −Pt−1  t Hit − i t+1 xi Hit  
Because the ﬁrst term does not depend on xi and the second
term is decreasing in xi, the gain from exiting is decreasing
in xi as well. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Weakly dominant strategies are
deﬁned in Lemmas 4 and 5. 
Proof of Lemma 6. We will show that, in any round t ≤
s−2, a provisional winner will bid even in the scenario that
is the most susceptible to bid shading. Suppose bidder i
with a valuation xi ∈  Pt P t+1  is a provisional winner in
round t −2. Consider a scenario that is most susceptible to
bid shading—(1) bidder i has the lowest valuation, xi = Pt,
(2) it is proﬁtable to exit in round t − 1 given a ranking
history, and (3) the lower bound of her opponent’s valua-
tion is the lowest, that is, the ranking history implies that
ˆ xt−2 Hi t−2  = Pt−3. Let  it xi Hi t−1  be bidder i’s expected
payoff in round t. Her gain from exiting in round t −2i s
Gi t−2 xi Hi t−2  =  xi −pt−3 
F P t−2 −F P t−3 
1−F P t−3 
− xi −pt−2 
F P t−2 −F P t−3 




 xi −pt−2 
F P t−1 −F P t−2 




 it xi Hi t−2 ∪ 0  
= 3
 2
1−F P t−3 
−3
 2








 it xi Hi t−2 ∪ 0  <0 
The ﬁrst term is the payoff of exiting when the opponent
also exits in round t − 2. The expected payoff of bidding
consists of the last three terms. The second term is a payoff
of bidding when the opponent exits in round t−2. The third
term is a payoff when the opponent bids in round t − 2,
bidder i is selected as a provisional winner in round t −1,
and the opponent exits in round t−1. Because  it is strictly
positive, the gain from exiting in round t −2 is negative.
Because a provisional winner i with a valuation xi = Pt
bids in round t −2, according to Lemma 5, any provisional
winner with a valuation xi >P t stays active. In other words,
a provisional winner in round t − 2 with a valuation x ∈
 Pt+j P t+j+1  for j =0 1     T−t−2 or, equivalently, a pro-
visional winner in round s = t −2−j with a valuation x ∈
 Pt P t+1  for j =0 1     t−3 will bid as well. 
Proof of Proposition 4. Because the amount of bid
shading is limited to only two bid levels according to
Lemma 6, the absolute amount of bid shading shrinks as
the bid increments become smaller. Moreover, the ﬁner bid
increments allow bidders to better express the value differ-
ences. Hence, the efﬁciency in the LAB auction is higher by
reducing bid increments. 
Proof of Lemma 7. We have to calculate a probability
that the ﬁnal price is Pt for t =0 1    T−1. For t>0, there
are two possible cases: (1) both bidders have valuations in
 Pt P t+1 , and (2) one bidder has a valuation in  Pt−1 P t  and
the other bidder has a valuation in  Pt 1 . The ﬁnal price is











 F Pt+1 −F P t  
2
+2 1−F P t   F Pt −F P t−1  
 
=
 T −2  2T +3 
6 T −1 2   
Proof of Lemma 8. The maximum shading strategies
are given as follows. A provisional winner does not infer
the opponent’s valuation from the ranking history. That is,
in any round t, she maximizes her payoff given that the
opponent has a valuation in  Pt−1 1 . Therefore, we can ﬁnd
that ˆ xt−1 Hi t−1  = Pt +  2/5   for any t ≥ 2 and for any
Hi t−1 ∈ t. If the ﬁnal price is Pt, there are three possible
combinations of bids determining the ﬁnal price: (1) only a
provisional winner exits in round t, (2) only a provisional
loser exits in round t, and (3) both of them exit in round
t+1. Because a provisional winner never shades more than
two bid levels below her valuation, a ranking history of
only three rounds before the ﬁnal round is relevant. Sup-
pose bidder i is a provisional winner at the ﬁnal round.
Hence, there are eight possible cases with a ﬁnal price of Pt
for t =3 4     T −4, as shown in Table A.1.
We have to calculate a probability that the auction ends at
P0, P1, P2, PT−3, and PT−2 separately because their associated
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Table A.1 Possible Scenarios in Which the Final Price Is Pt for t =3 4     T −4
Valuation
Case Ranking history Provisional winner Provisional loser Exiting bidder
1  Ri t−3 R i t−2 R i t−1 R i t = 1 1 1 1   P t +
2
5  Pt+1 +
2
5    Pt 1  Provisional winner
2  Ri t−3 R i t−2 R i t−1 R i t = 1 1 1 1   P t+1 +
2
5  1   P t−1 P t  Provisional loser
3  Ri t−3 R i t−2 R i t−1 R i t = 1 0 1 1   P t−1 +
2
5  Pt+1 +
2
5    Pt +
2
5  1  Provisional winner
4  Ri t−3 R i t−2 R i t−1 R i t = 0 1 1 1   P t +
2
5  Pt+1 +
2
5    Pt 1  Provisional winner
5  Ri t−3 R i t−2 R i t−1 R i t = 0 1 1 1   P t+1 +
2
5  1   P t−1 P t+1 +
2
5   Provisional loser
6  Ri t−3 R i t−2 R i t−1 R i t = 0 0 1 1   P t−1 P t+1 +
2
5    Pt +
2
5  1  Provisional winner
7  Ri t−2 R i t−1 R i t R i t+1 = 1 1 1 1   P t+1 +
2
5  Pt+2 +
2
5    Pt P t+1  Both
8  Ri t−2 R i t−1 R i t R i t+1 = 0 0 1 1   P t+1 +
2
5  Pt+2 +
2
5    Pt +
2
5  Pt+1  Both
Using Tables A.1 and A.2, we can calculate the expected
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Replacing   = 1/ T − 1  and Pt = t/ T − 1  with some
manipulation yields the expected revenue in Lemma 8. 
Proof of Proposition 5. According to Lemmas 7 and 8,
the lower bound and upper bound of the expected revenue
converge to 1/3. The expected revenue of the LAB auction
converges to 1/3 as well. 
Proof of Lemma 9. The calculation is similar to the proof
of Lemma 8 with ˆ xt−1 Hi t−1  = Pt +  2 1 −   / 5 1 +      
for any t ≥2 and for any Hi t−1 ∈t instead. 
Proof of Proposition 6. Using the lower bound deﬁned
in Lemma 9, we solve for   ∈  0 1  such that ˜ RMS
LAB T   
≥1/3. 
Proof of Proposition 7. The equilibrium bidding func-
tion is solved in the §9. The next step is to prove that if the
optimal exit bid is higher than the current clock price, it is
optimal to bid at the current clock price. Consider a bidder
with a valuation x who bids as if he has a valuation x . His
payoff function is
 t x
  x Mt  = xG x
   zt −Bt x
    Mt G x
   zt 
− 
  B−1
t  x    Mt 
x  x−Bt s   Mt dG s  zt  
Differentiating the payoff function with respect to x 
yields
 
 x  t x
  x z t  =  1+   x−Bt x
    Mt  g x




    Mt G x
   zt 
=  1+   x−x
  g x
   zt 
+ 1+   x
  −Bt x
    Mt  g x




    Mt G x
   zt 
=  1+   x−x
  g x
   zt  
Consider a bidder with valuation x such that Bt x   Mt 
>P t. She is constrained to bid either at the current clock
price or submit and an exit bid between Pt−1 and Pt. Because
 t x  x Mt  is increasing for all ˜ x<x , it is optimal to bid
at the current clock price. 
Proof of Proposition 8. According to Proposition 7, the
bidding strategy is symmetric and monotonic in valuation;
thus, the LABx auction is efﬁcient. 
Proof of Proposition 9. The allocation rules and ex-
pected payoffs of the lowest-valuation bidder of the HRB
and LABx auctions are the same. Furthermore, their payoff
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Table A.2 Possible Scenarios in Which the Final Prices Are P0 P 1 P 2 P T−3  and PT−2
Valuation
Final price Ranking history Provisional winner Provisional loser Exiting bidder
P0  Ri1 = 1   P 0 P 2 +
2
5    P0 1  Both
P1  Ri1 = 1   P 0 P 2 +
2
5    P1 1  Provisional winner
P1  Ri1 = 1   P 2 +
2
5  1   P 0 P 1  Provisional loser
P1  Ri1 R i2 = 1 1   P 2 +
2
5  P3 +
2
5    P1 P 2  Both
P2  Ri1 R i2 = 1 1   P 2 +
2
5  P3 +
2
5    P2 1  Provisional winner
P2  Ri1 R i2 = 1 1   P 3 +
2
5  1   P 1 P 2  Provisional loser
P2  Ri1 R i2 = 0 1   P 1 P 3 +
2
5    P2 +
2
5  1  Provisional winner
P2  Ri1 R i2 R i3 = 1 1 1   P 3 +
2
5  P4 +
2
5    P2 P 3  Both
P2  Ri1 R i2 R i3 = 0 1 1   P 3 +
2
5  P4 +
2
5    P2 +
2
5  P3  Both
PT−2  Ri T−6 R i T−5 R i T−4 R i T−3 = 1 1 1 1   P T−3 +
2
5  PT−2 +
2
5    PT−3 1  Provisional winner
PT−2  Ri T−6 R i T−5 R i T−4 R i T−3 = 1 1 1 1   P T−2 +
2
5  1   P T−4 P T−3  Provisional loser
PT−2  Ri T−6 R i T−5 R i T−4 R i T−3 = 1 0 1 1   P T−4 +
2
5  PT−2 +
2
5    PT−3 +
2
5  1  Provisional winner
PT−2  Ri T−6 R i T−5 R i T−4 R i T−3 = 0 1 1 1   P T−3 +
2
5  PT−2 +
2
5    PT−3 1  Provisional winner
PT−2  Ri T−6 R i T−5 R i T−4 R i T−3 = 0 1 1 1   P T−2 +
2
5  1   P T−4 P T−2 +
2
5   Provisional loser
PT−2  Ri T−6 R i T−5 R i T−4 R i T−3 = 0 0 1 1   P T−4 P T−2 +
2
5    PT−3 +
2
5  1  Provisional winner
PT−2  Ri T−5 R i T−4 R i T−3 R i T−2 = 1 1 1 1   P T−2 +
2
5  1   P T−3 P T−2  Both
PT−2  Ri T−5 R i T−4 R i T−3 R i T−2 = 0 0 1 1   P T−2 +
2
5  1   P T−3 +
2
5  PT−2  Both
PT−1  Ri T−5 R i T−4 R i T−3 R i T−2 = 1 1 1 1   P T−2 +
2
5  1   P T−2 1  Provisional winner
PT−1  Ri T−5 R i T−4 R i T−3 R i T−2 = 1 0 1 1   P T−3 +
2
5  1   P T−2 +
2
5  1  Provisional winner
PT−1  Ri T−5 R i T−4 R i T−3 R i T−2 = 0 1 1 1   P T−2 +
2
5  1   P T−2 1  Provisional winner
PT−1  Ri T−5 R i T−4 R i T−3 R i T−2 = 0 0 1 1   P T−3 1   P T−2 +
2
5  1  Provisional winner
Because bidders shade their bids in the LABx auction,
fear of losing therefore impacts the bidding strategy. In con-
trast, bidders bid truthfully in the HRB auction so that the
strategy is not affected by fear of losing. As the exit bid
function is increasing in  , the expected revenue of the
LABx auction is increasing in   as well. 
Solving for the Equilibrium with the Uniform
Distribution, Fixed Increment, and Four Bid Levels
In this section, deﬁne  it xi q it Hit  as bidder i’s expected
payoff if she submits qit ∈ 1 0  given bidder i’s ranking his-
tory Hit. Note that we can omit the other bidder’s ranking
history because it is the complement of bidder i’s ranking
history. We will solve for the bidding strategy of the bidder
with the lowest valuation ﬁrst.
First, consider a bidder i with valuation xi ∈ P0 P 1 . If she
is a provisional winner in round 1, according to Lemma 3,
she will exit in round 1.
Next, consider a bidder i with valuation xi ∈  P1 P 2 .
If she is a provisional winner in round 2, she will exit. When
she is a provisional winner in round 1, she will exit as well
because
 i1 xi 0  1   ≡  xi −P0 
F P 1 −F P 0 
1−F P 0 
=  xi −P0  >  i1 xi 1  1  
≡  xi −P1 
F P 1 −F P 0 




 xi −P1 
F P 2 −F P 1 




 xi −P1   
Finally, consider a bidder i with valuation xi ∈ P2 P 3 .I f
she is a provisional winner in round 3, she will exit. When
she is a provisional winner in round 2 and Hi2 =  1 1 ,
which implies that the opponent has a valuation in  P1 1 ,
she will exit because
 i2 xi 0  1 1   ≡  xi −P1 
F P 2 −F P 1 
1−F P 1 
=  xi −P1 
 
1−F P 1 
>  i2 xi 1  1 1  
≡  xi −P2 
F P 2 −F P 1 




 xi −P1 
F P 2 −F P 1 




 xi −P2 
 
1−F P 1 
 
If she is a provisional winner in round 2 and Hi2 = 0 1 ,
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Table A.3 Possible Outcomes for All Realizations in Round 1 and
H11 = 1 
Bidder 2’s value
Bidder 1’s value  P0 P 1   P 1 P 2   P 2 P 2 +
2
5    P2 +
2
5  P3 
 P0 P 1 P 0 P1 P1 P1
 P1 P 2 P 0 P1 P1 P1
 P2 P 2 +
2
5   P0 P1 P1 P1
 P2 +
2
5  P3 P 1 Cont. Cont. Cont.
Table A.4 Possible Outcomes for All Realizations in Round 2 and
H12 = 1 1 
Bidder 2’s value
Bidder 1’s value  P0 P 1   P 1 P 2   P 2 P 2 +
2
5    P2 +
2
5  P3 
 P0 P 1  —— — —
 P1 P 2  —— — —
 P2 P 2 +
2
5   —— — —
 P2 +
2
5  P3  — P1 P2 P2
the opponent will bid according to Lemma 4. Therefore, the
provisional winner will also bid in round 2.
If she is a provisional winner in round 1, we can calculate
ˆ x ≡ ˆ x1  1   by solving  i1 ˆ x 0  1  = i1 ˆ x 1  1   as follows:
 ˆ x−P0 
F P 1 −F P 0 
1−F P 0 
=  ˆ x−P1 
F P 1 −F P 0 




 ˆ x−P1 
F P 1 −F P 0 





 ˆ x−P2 
F P 2 −F P 1 




 ˆ x−P2 
F P 2 −F P 1 
1−F P 0 
 
 
 ˆ x−P0 
 
1−P0




























To calculate the expected revenue, we consider all pos-
sible realizations of valuations and outcomes as shown in
Tables A.3–A.5.
Outcomes when ranking histories are H11 =  0 , H12 =
 0 0 , and H12 = 0 1  are similar to Tables A.3–A.5, respec-
tively, with bidders 1 and 2 swapped. Therefore,













































   
 
Table A.5 Possible Outcomes for All Realizations in Round 2 and
H12 = 1 0 
Bidder 2’s value
Bidder 1’s value  P0 P 1   P 1 P 2   P 2 P 2 +
2
5    P2 +
2
5  P3 
 P0 P 1  —— — —
 P1 P 2  —— — —
 P2 P 2 +
2
5   —— — —
 P2 +
2
5  P3  — P2 P2 P2
Substituting  P0 P 1 P 2 P 3  =  0 1/3 2/3 1  and   = 1/3
yields an expected revenue of 0.2778.
References
Ausubel, L. M., P. Cramton. 2004. Auctioning many divisible goods.
J. Eur. Econom. Assoc. 2(April–May) 480–493.
Chwe, M. S.-Y. 1989. The discrete bid ﬁrst price auction. Econom.
Lett. 31 303–306.
Cramton, P., E. Filiz-Ozbay, E. Ozbay, P. Sujarittanonta. 2009. Fear
of losing in dynamic auctions: An experimental study. Working
paper, University of Maryland, College Park.
David, E., A. Rogers, N. R. Jennings, J. Schiff, S. Kraus, M. H.
Rothkopf. 2007. Optimal design of English auctions with dis-
crete bid levels. ACM Trans. Internet Tech. 7(2) Article 12.
Delgado, M. R., A. Schotter, E. Ozbay, E. A. Phelps. 2008. Under-
standing overbidding: Using the neural circuitry of reward to
design economic auctions. Science 321 1849–1852.
Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R. 1989. The effect of regret on optimal bid-
ding in auctions. Management Sci. 35(6) 685–692.
Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R., E. Katok. 2007. Regret in auctions: Theory
and evidence. Econom. Theory 33(1) 81–101.
Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R., E. Katok. 2008. Regret and feedback infor-
mation in ﬁrst-price sealed-bid auctions. Management Sci. 54(4)
808–819.
Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R., E. Katok. 2009. A direct test of risk aver-
sion and regret in ﬁrst price sealed-bid auctions. Decision Anal.
6(2) 75–86.
Filiz-Ozbay, E., E. Y. Ozbay. 2007. Auctions with anticipated regret:
Theory and experiment. Amer. Econom. Rev. 97(4) 1407–1418.
Koszegi, B., M. Rabin. 2006. A model of reference-dependent pref-
erences. Quart. J. Econom. 121(4) 1133–1166.
Lange, A., A. Ratan. 2010. Multi-dimensional reference-dependent
preferences in sealed-bid auctions—How (most) laboratory
experiments differ from the ﬁeld. Games Econom. Behav. 68(2)
634–645.
Mathews, T., A. Sengupta. 2008. Sealed bid second price auctions
with discrete bidding. Appl. Econom. Res. Bull. 1(1) 31–52.
Ministry of Communications and Information Technology. 2008.
Auction of 3G and BWA spectrum. Information memoran-
dum, Department of Telecommunications, Ministry of Com-
munications and Information Technology, Government of
India.
Rothkopf, M. H., R. M. Harstad. 1994. On the role of discrete bid
levels in oral auctions. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 74(3) 572–581.
I
N
F
O
R
M
S
h
o
l
d
s
c
o
p
y
r
i
g
h
t
t
o
t
h
i
s
a
r
t
i
c
l
e
a
n
d
d
i
s
t
r
i
b
u
t
e
d
t
h
i
s
c
o
p
y
a
s
a
c
o
u
r
t
e
s
y
t
o
t
h
e
a
u
t
h
o
r
(
s
)
.
A
d
d
i
t
i
o
n
a
l
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
,
i
n
c
l
u
d
i
n
g
r
i
g
h
t
s
a
n
d
p
e
r
m
i
s
s
i
o
n
p
o
l
i
c
i
e
s
,
i
s
a
v
a
i
l
a
b
l
e
a
t
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
j
o
u
r
n
a
l
s
.
i
n
f
o
r
m
s
.
o
r
g
/
.